Cy Pres and the Discriminatory Trust by McCrea, Bruce B.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 23 | Issue 2 Article 11
1-1972
Cy Pres and the Discriminatory Trust
Bruce B. McCrea
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Bruce B. McCrea, Cy Pres and the Discriminatory Trust, 23 Hastings L.J. 604 (1972).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol23/iss2/11
CY PRES AND THE DISCRIMINATORY TRUST
Charitable bequests in trust have long been recognized as socially
worthwhile by the California courts.' Because the general community
is the ultimate beneficiary of a charitable trust, courts have generally
construed testamentary instruments containing charitable bequests quite
liberally2 and applied the equitable power of cy pres to give effect to
otherwise invalid bequests.
The cy pres doctrine4 invokes an equitable power which was in-
herited by American jurisprudence along with the common law of
England. This equitable power to reform wills has been utilized by
the English common law courts for centuries, and has been employed
in varying factual situations throughout this country.5 Some ninety
years ago in Estate of Hinckley,6 the California Supreme Court first
acknowledged the cy pres power and set the tenor for application of the
equitable doctrine in California cases involving charitable trusts.7  The
language employed in Hinckley suggested the great breadth of the
power:
[T]he Courts look with favor upon all attempted charitable dona-
tions, and will endeavor to carry them into effect if it can be done
consistently with the rules of law. A bequest intended as a charity
is not void, and there is no authority to construe it to be legally
1. See, e.g., Estate of Hinckley, 58 Cal. 457 (1881).
2. Estate of Tarrant, 38 Cal. 2d 42, 46, 237 P.2d 505, 506 (1951); see Estate of
Hinckley, 58 Cal. 457, 513 (1881).
3. 4A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1 587, at 564.68 (P. Rohan ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as POWELL]; Fisch, Changing Concepts and Cy Pres, 44 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 382 (1959).
4. The Model Act Concerning the Administration of Charitable Trusts, De-
vises and Bequests, quoted in 4 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 399, at 3085 (3d ed.
1967), defines the doctrine as follows: "If a trust for charity is or becomes illegal,
or impossible or impracticable of fulfillment or if a devise or bequest for charity, at
the time it was intended to become effective is illegal, or impossible or impracticable of
fulfillment, and if the settlor, or testator, manifested a general intention to devote the
property to charity, a [court of equity] may, on application of any trustee, or any inter-
ested party or the attorney general of the state, order an administration of the trust,
devise or bequest as nearly as possible to fulfill the general charitable intention of the
settlor or testator."
5. See generally E. FISCH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES
(1950) [hereinafter cited as FISCH].
6. 58 Cal. 457 (1881).
7. "We entertain no doubt that in the general devolution upon the Courts of
this State of all judicial power, with respect to charities, is included in the power cy
pres . . . . [A] resort can be had to the doctrine without departing from the strict
limits of ordinary Chancery Jurisdiction." Id. at 512-13.
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void, if it can possibly be made good.8
Legal writers frequently state that before the doctrine of cy pres
can be applied certain "prerequisites" must be satisfied: (1) there must
be a valid charitable trust; (2) the trust must be impossible, imprac-
ticable, or illegal to administer in exact accordance with the settlor's
terms; and (3) there must be an expression of general charitable in-
tent by the settlor.9 The cases discussed in this note involving cy pres
suggest a growing judicial preference to give effect to charitable trusts,
and to minimize the showing necessary to satisfy these three traditional
"prerequisites." Courts have shown an alacrity to utilize the cy pres
power to give effect to charitable trusts when the testamentary disposi-
tions are ambiguous, or otherwise impermissible, unless the settlor has
expressed only one purpose, and that purpose is impracticable or Me-
gal.'
0
The courts which have taken this liberal approach to the imple-
mentation of an instrument containing a charitable bequest have es-
tablished a number of presumptions to aid in the construction of wills
and have also developed common definitions of certain terms of con-
struction. For example, a "general charitable intent" has been inter-
preted to mean that a trust can be sustained if the instrument discloses
that the settlor had in mind a beneficial purpose besides the one deemed
impossible, impracticable, or illegal." In fact, the California Supreme
Court has stated that the designation of a charitable beneficiary gives
rise to a presumption that the settlor intended at least the charitable por-
8. Id. at 513.
9. FxscH, supra note 5, § 5.00; 4A POWELL, supra note 3, 587, at 564.63.
Intent must be ascertained from the instrument establishing the trust and the cir-
cumstances surrounding its execution, so the court must consider each factual situation
individually in arriving at a conclusion. There is no rule of thumb to follow in deter-
mining intent, and the presence or absence of any one or more factors is not conclusive
in and of itself. FiscH, supra note 5, § 5.03(a); Comment, A Revaluation of Cy Pres,
49 YALE LJ. 303 (1939).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399, comment n (1959); 4 A. SCOTT,
supra note 4, § 399; cf. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 441 (1970).
To justify their exercise of the cy pres power, courts look to and cite as con-
trolling any one or more of the following factors: (1) the fact that the bulk of the
estate is bequeathed to charity; (2) the absence of a provision for a reverter or gift
over in the event the particular purpose fails; (3) the settlor's authorizing the trustee
to deviate if the expressed purpose becomes impossible of accomplishment; (4) the pre-
sumption against intestacy; (5) the policy of preserving charitable trusts whenever
possible; (6) the occurrence of the events causing the failure of the trust subsequent to
the commencement of the trust; (7) the express or implied disinheritance of heirs; and
(8) the charitable background of the settlor. 4A POWELL, supra note 3, 587, at
564.68-64.69; see 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 4, § 399.2, at 3095-97.
11. Howard Sav. Inst'n v. Peep, 34 NJ. 494, 501, 170 A.2d 39, 42-43 (1961);
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399, comment d (1959); L. SHERIDAN & V.
DELANY, THE CY-PRns DocTRINE 33-36 (1959).
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tion of the bequest to be given effect if the entire trust cannot be im-
plemented for some reason.' 2
However, in a recent case, Estate of Vanderhoofven,13 the Cali-
fornia District Court of Appeal for the Third District refused to apply
cy pres in a situation where the doctrine might have been exercised
and remanded the case for consideration of possible extrinsic evidence
to further ascertain the testator's dominant intent. This note will ex-
plore the general application of cy pres by the courts in implementing
charitable trusts and will analyze the Vanderhoofven decision in light
of prior cases in California and other jurisdictions in which the courts
have applied this equitable power. The note will conclude that the
court's failure to apply cy pres was improper and out of step with the
majority of prior California cases as to this issue.
The Vanderhoofven Case
Elmer H. Vanderhoofven died July 30, 1962, and his holographic
will dated October 29, 1959, was admitted to probate. The document
consisted of a single handwritten page and with spelling and grammati-
cal errors intact read as follows:
Oct 29/1959
Being of sound mind in this will, I must say again to forestall
all other wills.
I will +ie not not not give or bequith any of my real properity
or holdings personal or otherwise to anyone other than my fambly,
regardless of what I have written before.
I do give one dollar each to my brothers & sisters and the rest
to some Protestant school that is all white of Engingeering training,
I care not which.
Elmer H. Vanderhoofven
14
Crocker-Anglo National Bank was appointed administrator of the
decedent's estate, and the will was admitted to probate. In the pro-
bate proceedings, the attorney general represented the state of Cali-
fornia and asserted the right of the public to benefit from the testator's
charitable bequest. Some eight claimants,1" related to the testator or
having been named in prior wills, joined to contest the probate pro-
ceedings on the ground that the testator's intent was discriminatory, as
evidenced by the qualification "all white" in the will, and thus could
not be effectuated. The claimants had agreed among themselves, prior
12. O'Hara v. Grand Lodge, 213 Cal. 131, 141, 2 P.2d 21, 25 (1931).
13. 18 Cal. App. 3d 940, 96 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1971).
14. Id. at 943, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
15. These eight persons included six siblings of the decedent, as well as the sole
distributee of the estate of a deceased mother (who died after the decedent) and a
claimant under one of Vanderhoofven's prior wills.
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to the litigation, to accept equal shares of the distributable estate if the
court found in their favor.
The probate court implicitly recognized that it had to balance
competing policy considerations in its interpretation of the will. The
court had to determine whether the will could be probated as written,
or whether the discriminatory provision had rendered the gift void. In
the event the will was invalid, the estate would have to be distributed
according to the laws of intestacy. In deciding the case the court ac-
knowledged the long standing rule of construction that a will is to be
interpreted in a manner that best effectuates the intent of the testator.'
Therefore, the court was faced with the determination in Vanderhoof-
yen as to whether the testator's intent was sufficiently clear from the
face of the will and, if not, whether the testator's intent was otherwise
indicated.
Without admitting any extrinsic evidence, the probate court found
that the will was discriminatory in its terms and that racial bigotry was
evidently the primary intent of the decedent. 7 Therefore, declared
the court, the literal terms of the document could not be implemented
because such action would be fostering discrimination and would vio-
late the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.', In-
stead, the court concluded that the testator would not have made the
bequest had he known that the bequest could not go to a segregated in-
stitution and would have preferred the trust assets to be distributed to
his heirs.' 9 The probate court reached this conclusion even though the
testator had specifically provided that his brothers and sisters were to
receive only "one dollar each"!
Despite the general public policy favoring charitable trusts, and
the marked judicial preference to avoid an incomplete testamentary
disposition, 20 the probate court refused to give effect to the charitable
bequest. The attorney general filed an appeal with the court of appeal
contending that the cy pres doctrine should have been applied to give
effect to the public charitable bequest.2' The appellate court was pre-
sented with three alternative courses of action: (1) it could affirm the
16. Id. at 947, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 264; accord, Estate of Russell, 69 Cal. 2d 200,
205, 444 P.2d 353, 356, 70 Cal. Rptr. 561, 564 (1968); Estate of Karkeet, 56 Cal. 2d
277, 281, 363 P.2d 896, 899, 14 Cal. Rptr. 664, 667 (1961); Estate of Resler, 43
Cal. 2d 726, 732, 278 P.2d 1, 5 (1954); Estate of Akeley, 35 Cal. 2d 26, 28, 215
P.2d 921, 922 (1950); In re Estate of Wilson, 184 Cal. 63, 66-67, 193 P. 581, 582
(1920).
17. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 946, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Estate of Akeley, 35 Cal. 2d 26, 29, 215 P.2d 921, 922 (1950).
21. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 943, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 261. Since the state has a genuine
interest in charitable trusts, the attorney general or similar public official has the
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lower court's decision, allowing the bequest to fail and the property to
pass according to the laws of intestacy (or, really, by terms of the
claimants' stipulated agreement); (2) it could remand the case with
instructions to consider possible extrinsic evidence to ascertain the tes-
tator's dominant intent; or (3) it could reverse with instructions that
the trial judge give effect to the charitable bequest by applying cy pres.
The appellate court acknowledged the apparently contradictory
expressions of intent in the language of the will, and noted that the
trial judge had adopted one of several plausible constructions. 22  How-
ever, the court further emphasized that the law demands greater cer-
tainty as to a testator's dominant intent and that the probate court was
in error in relying solely on the terms of the will to ascertain that
intent.2 The court concluded that in order to comply with California
Probate Code section 101,24 the case would be remanded for addi-
tional consideration of possible extrinsic evidence to establish the tes-
tator's dominant intent. The court held that cy pres could not im-
mediately be applied, 25  because the "dominant intent" of the testator
was not clear from the face of the will, and remanded the case for ascer-
tainment of such dominant intent, if any. In so holding, the court ap-
parently misconstrued or deliberately restricted the broad scope and
application given the cy pres doctrine as discussed herein.
Upon remand, the probate court will be confronted with several al-
ternative interpretations which will necessitate consideration of extrinsic
evidence to resolve the "latent ambiguity." The probate court will have
to determine whether the "all white" clause is in fact the sine qua non
of the decedent's provision. However, if, as asserted in this note, the
appellate court had eliminated the racial restriction at the outset, the
duty of policing and supervising the enforcement of the trusts. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12588 (West 1963). He is a necessary party to any judicial proceeding to modify
or terminate any charitable trust and may bring suit on his own initiative or on the
initiative of a third person to insure proper performance of the trust. Id. § 12591.
22. "[I]t is to be noted that decedent, on the face of his will, having first stated,
'I will net not not not give . . . any of my real property or holdings personal or
otherwise to anyone other than my fambly,' in the very next sentence gave 'one dollar
each to my [six] brothers & sisters' who were then his only known heirs at law.
Effectually, the probate court's decision would give to these six and two others the
entire estate. We point out that if distribution is carried out as expressed in the pro-
bate court's decree, the testator's intent obviously is not being carried out. On the
face of the will his expressed intents are multiple and contradictory." 18 Cal. App. 3d
at 946 n.1, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64 n.1.
23. "We fail to see the logic in adopting one only of several tenable courses
without recourse to possible extrinsic evidence as a source of possible clarification." Id.
24. CAL. PROB. CODE § 101 (West 1956). "A will is to be construed according
to the intention of the testator. Where his intention can not have effect to its full
extent, it must have effect as far as possible."
25. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 947-48, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 264-65.
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ambiguity would have been eliminated, and the probate court could
have probated the document as reformed.
In its decision the appellate court relied on Estate of Black26 "as
a pattern" to follow in resolving the case before them. This case had
held that extrinsic evidence is always admissible to resolve a latent am-
biguity.17 And, consistent with that decision, the Vanderhoofven court
held that possible extrinsic evidence must be entertained to ascertain
the testator's dominant intent.28  Considering the fact that the court
had already dismissed the "protestant" restriction as insignificant, 2 9 the
remand was essentially to determine whether or not the "all white" pro-
vision was controlling.
The appellate court remanded the case despite its observation that
distribution of the estate pursuant to the probate court's decree-that
"'all white' was the sine qua non of decedent's intent ' 30 -would
obviously not effect the testator's intent.3 ' By his expression, "I care
not which, ' 32 the testator gave the trustees considerable discretion in
selecting the specific charitable recipient and implied that the qualify-
ing language was not to control. These observations would further sup-
port the position that the settlor's objective was to benefit education, and
that a variance from the literal terms of the will would not defeat his
charitable purpose.
Consequently, a remand to consider further evidence was not re-
quired. The court had determined the "protestant" provision to be of
no significance, and, if the court had deleted the racial restriction, a
reversal with instructions to probate the will minus the discriminatory
terms would have been appropriate.
The Evans Cases
The parties in Vanderhoofven both cited a recent Supreme Court
decision, Evans v. Abney,33 in support of their respective positions.
The Evans case culminated a series of proceedings involving the dis-
position of property in Georgia. The complex factual situation in-
volved the construction of the 1911 will of Senator A. 0. Bacon of
Georgia. Senator Bacon, as settlor under a trust, had devised a tract
of land to the city of Macon, Georgia, to be used as a "park and pleas-
26. 211 Cal. App. 2d 75, 27 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1962).
27. Id. at 84, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
28. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 948, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
29. Id. at 944, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
30. Id. at 946, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
31. Id. at 946 n.1, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.1.
32. Id. at 943, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
33. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
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ure ground" for white people only. The settlor designated the city as
trustee and, pursuant to his wishes, the park was operated as a segre-
gate facility until the early 1960's. However, in the midst of growing
legislation and public pressure for equal civil rights, the city finally
agreed to integrate the facility. Individual members of the board of
managers of the city of Macon brought suit against the city asking the
court to remove the city as trustee and to appoint a replacement. Sub-
sequently, the city resigned as trustee and the Georgia court appointed
three individuals as private trustees to operate the segregated facility.
3 4
A group of Negro citizens in the state appealed to the Georgia Su-
preme Court alleging that the appointment of private trustees was a
subterfuge to continue illegal segregation practices. The court held
against the citizens' group because: (1) the testator possessed the
right to bequeath his property to a "limited class" and (2) the state's
courts were empowered to appoint new trustees in order that the trust
not fail.35 The United States Supreme Court eventually reversed the
state court, concluding that "[t]he momentum [the park] acquired as a
public facility is certainly not dissipated ipso facto by the appointment
of 'private' trustees."36
On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court interpreted the Supreme
Court's decision as an affirmative statement that the trust was impossi-
ble of accomplishment since the sole purpose of the trust had been de-
clared illegal. 37  Therefore, the case was remanded to the Georgia trial
court where the court decreed that the property should be returned to
the testator's heirs in accordance with a Georgia statute38 which pro-
vided for a reversionary interest upon the failure of a limited bequest.
The court's determination was opposed unsuccessfully at trial by the
Georgia attorney general who had argued that the doctrine of cy pres
34. Id. at 437-38. Unlike discrimination by a state or state instrumentality,
which has been determined to be unconstitutional, private discrimination which re-
quires no judicial enforcement has been declared outside the Fourteenth Amendment.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (dictum). This policy was recently con-
firmed by a statement in Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296, 300 (1966): "If a testator wanted to leave a school or center for the use of
one race only and in no way implicated the State in the supervision, control, or man-
agement of that facility, we assume arguendo that no constitutional difficulty would be
encountered." However, if a state instrumentality is designated as trustee for a trust
which includes discriminatory provisions, the court must strike it down as violative of
the Constitution. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trust, 353 U.S. 230, 231
(1957) (per curiam).
35. Evans v. Newton, 220 Ga. 280, 285, 138 S.E.2d 573, 577 (1964), rev'd, 382
U.S. 296 (1966).
36. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966).
37. Evans v. Newton, 221 Ga. 870, 871, 148 S.E.2d 329, 330-31 (1966).
38. GA. CODE ANN. § 108-106(4) (1959).
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should be applied to eliminate the racial restriction and to permit the
trust to continue maintenance of the park on an integrated basis. The
trial court rejected this argument, however, and held that the testator
would have preferred the trust fail rather than the park be integrated.
Cy pres was held inapplicable by the Georgia court because "the park's
segregated, whites-only character was an essential and inseparable part
of the testator's plan." 9
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the decision of the trial
court,40 and the matter was once again appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, which affirmed the holding of the Georgia court by a
six to two vote of the justices. 41  The majority opinion specifically re-
ferred to the unusual amount of information the testator had included
in his will unmistakably defining his primary testamentary intent for
making the bequest. 42 The Court concluded that the will allowed one
disposition and one disposition only,43 and that in this situation the
equitable doctrine of cy pres was inapplicable.
It is not true that a charitable trust never fails where it is impossible
to carry out the particular purpose of the testator. In some cases
. ..it appears that the accomplishment of the particular purpose
and only that purpose was desired by the testator and that he had
no more general charitable intent and that he would presumably
have preferred to have the whole trust fail if the particular pur-
pose is impossible of accomplishment. In such a case the ey pres
doctrine is not applicable.
44
The Court made it clear that its decision to affirm the holding of
the Georgia court should not be construed to limit the traditional oper-
39. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 439 (1970).
40. Evans v. Abney, 224 Ga. 826, 833, 165 S.E.2d 160, 166 (1968), aff'd 396
U.S. 435 (1970).
41. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
42. The Senator specified that "the park should be for 'the sole, perpetual and
unending, use, benefit and enjoyment of the white women, white girls, white boys and
white children of the City of Macon."' He continued by stating that "'the said prop-
erty under no circumstances ... [is] to be ...at any time for any reason devoted
to any other purpose or use excepting so far as herein specifically authorized."' Id.
at 441-42.
43. The Senator explained his personal philosophy in an unmistakable fashion:
"I take occasion to say that in limiting the use and enjoyment of this property per-
petually to white people, I am not influenced by any unkindness of feeling or want
of consideration for the Negroes, or colored people. On the contrary I have for them
the kindest feeling, and for many of them esteem and regard, while for some of them
I have sincere personal affection.
'I am, however, without hesitation in the opinion that in their social relations the
two races ...should be forever separate and that they should not have pleasure or
recreation grounds to be used or enjoyed, together and in common."' Id. at 442.
44. 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 4, § 399, at 3085, quoted in Evans v. Abney, 396
U.S. 435, 441 (1970).
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ation of cy pres, but was instead limited to the question "whether as a
matter of state law the doctrine of cy pres should be applied to prevent
the trust itself from failing."45  Since the Georgia courts had decided
against applying cy pres, the Supreme Court concluded that they "did
no more than apply well-settled general principles of Georgia law to de-
termine the meaning and effect of a Georgia will."46 The statute which
codifies the cy pres doctrine in Georgia requires a manifestation of
general intent by the testator,4 7 and the Georgia courts found this in-
gredient lacking in Senator Bacon's will." The Georgia courts had
concluded instead that the settlor preferred the trust to fail rather than
to allow racial integration and the Supreme Court refused to disturb
this finding on appeal.49
Both parties in Vanderhoofven contended on appeal that Abney
supported their respective positions.5° The eight claimants contended
that on the basis of Abney51 they should prevail on appeal since the
probate court had concluded that bigotry constituted the testator's sole
45. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 440 (1970) (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 439. As to the applicable state law, the Supreme Court observed that
"[a]t the time Senator Bacon made his will Georgia cities and towns were, and they
still are, authorized to accept devises of property for the establishment and preserva-
tion of 'parks and pleasure grounds' and to hold the property thus received in charitable
trust for the exclusive benefit of the class of persons named by the testator." Id. at
439-40. See GA. CODE ANN. § 69-505 (1967). The Georgia Code also explicitly au-
thorized the testator to include racial restrictions in such a charitable devise.
Id. § 69-504.
47. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-815 (1959).
48. "The Georgia courts, construing Senator Bacon's will as a whole . . . con-
cluded . . . that the Senator's charitable intent was not 'general' but extended only to
the establishment of a segregated park for the benefit of white people. The Georgia
trial court found that 'Senator Bacon could not have used language more clearly indi-
cating his intent that the benefits of Baconsfield should be extended to white persons
only, or more clearly indicating that this limitation was an essential and indispensable
part of his plan for Baconsfield.'" Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 442 (1970).
49. Id. at 437. The Supreme Court stressed that "[t]he construction of wills
is essentially a state-law question ...... Id. at 444. It acknowledged the discretion
allowed by Georgia probate law to a trial court in the interpretation of a testamentary
instrument: "The only choice the Georgia courts either had or exercised in this regard
was their judicial judgment in construing Bacon's will to determine his intent .... "
Id. at 446. The Court found no constitutional violation. "[T]he action of the Georgia
Supreme Court declaring the Baconsfield trust terminated presents no violation of con-
stitutionally protected rights ....... d. at 444. And it was thus bound by the deci-
sion below regardless of the fact that the justices might personally have found the
Georgia state law socially undesirable. "The responsibility of this Court, however, is
to construe and enforce the Constitution and laws of the land as they are and not to
legislate social policy on the basis of our own personal inclinations." Id. at 447.
50. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Hearing at 14, Estate of Vanderhoofven,
No. 12289 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
51. Id. at 5-7.
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motive 2 and cy pres was thus inappropriate where the only purpose
has proven to be illegal. 53  The attorney general, on the other hand,
argued that cy pres should be applied on the basis of Abney since the
testator had expressed several purposes in his will, not the least impor-
tant of which was to foster education in the field of engineering."
The appellate court in Vanderhoofven recognized Abney as re-
affirming the position that the applicability of cy pres is a matter of
state law 55 and did not attempt to make any extended comparison of
the two cases. The majority did suggest, however, that the wills of
the testators in the two cases differed considerably insofar as their pre-
occupation with race was shown and noted "that Senator Bacon's will
was more specific in expressing the testator's intent"' 56 than was the will
before the appellate court.
In this regard, it is important to emphasize the fact that charitable
trusts are usually upheld unless (1) the "charitable" features are
deemed "merely incidental" to the testator's dispositive scheme and
(2) the only purpose of the testator disclosed in the instrument is il-
legal, impossible, or impracticable.5 7  In view of this well established
rule, the probate court in Vanderhoofven would have had to find that
the provisions in the will indicated that racial bigotry was the only
possible motivation of the settlor. In a brief letter opinion, the pro-
bate judge said that examination of the face of the will itself disclosed
that the "all white" provision was the sine qua non of testator's intent;
and unless such intent could be given effect, the testator would have
preferred the property to pass by intestacy.
58
On appeal, however, the court concluded that this analysis of the
terms of the will was merely conjectural on the part of the probate judge
and that additional extrinsic evidence would be required to establish the
testator's intent.59 Under California law,
[i]f the construction of the instant will is based upon its terms
without the aid of extrinsic evidence its construction is one of law
and [the reviewing court is] not bound by the trial court's inter-
pretation of it.60
The decision of the court of appeal to remand the case for con-
52. See id. at 4.
53. Id.
54. Appellant's Petition for Hearing at 5, Estate of Vanderhoofven, No. 12289
(Sup. Ct. 1971).
55. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 945, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
56. Id.
57. See 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 4, § 399.
58. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 946, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
59. Id. at 946-48, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 263-65.
60. Estate of Black, 211 Cal. App. 2d 75, 83, 27 Cal. Rptr. 418, 423 (1962):
"The basis of the rule is that where no extrinsic evidence has been considered there
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sideration of possible extrinsic evidence as to testator's intent appears
questionable. Arguably, the terms of the will relating to "engineering
training" would have been sufficient to warrant the finding of a chari-
table purpose 61 -less than this has convinced other courts 62 -so that the
testator's will could have been given effect through the use of cy pres.6 3
The courts in other California cases have proven far more receptive
to the application of the cy pres doctrine, and the decision in Vander-
hoofven seems to fly in the face of California's liberal application of the
cy pres doctrine.64  Further, there is growing authority in other juris-
dictions for the proposition that a court utilizing cy pres may simply
delete the discriminatory provisions of a will and implement the other-
wise valid charitable bequest. 65
Discriminatory Trusts and Cy ]Pres: The Modern
Trend Outside California
Trusts whose provisions restrict the class of potential beneficiaries
by excluding a particular racial or religious group may be classified as
discriminatory trusts. Such restrictions may either be illegal66 or may
so hinder the administration of the trust as to make the fulfillment of
the settlor's general charitable purpose impossible or impracticable.1
7
Whatever the effect of the restrictions, the court faced with the question
of how the trust is to be administered must determine whether it
will be terminated or administered free of the restrictions.
The modern trend in cases indicates that courts will save the trust
whenever possible by applying cy pres.68 Before considering the ap-
plication of cy pres by the California courts, the approach taken by
other jurisdictions will be briefly reviewed.
is no issue of fact. It is the duty of an appellate court, therefore, to make the final
determination in accordance with applicable principles of law."
Estate of Russell, 69 Cal. 2d 200, 213, 444 P.2d 353, 362, 70 Cal. Rptr. 561, 570
(1968), "[I]t is 'solely a judicial function to interpret a written instrument unless the
interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence'. . . . Accordingly,
,an appellate court is not bound by a construction of a document based solely upon
the terms of the written instrument without the aid of extrinsic evidence, where there
is no conflict in the evidence, or a determination has been made upon incompetent
evidence.'"
61. The court almost seems to suggest that such a purpose can be found. See
18 Cal. App. 3d at 948, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
62. See notes 68-106 & accompanying text infra.
63. See notes 9-12 & accompanying text supra.
64. See notes 120-52 & accompanying text infra.
65. See notes 69-106 & accompanying text infra.
66. See discussion in note 34 supra.
67. See discussion in note 71 infra.
68. 4A POWELL, supra note 3, 587, at 564.68; Fisch, Changing Concepts and
Cy Pres, 44 CORNELL L. REV. 382 (1959).
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The judicial interpretation and administration of the following
trust instrument exemplifies the inclination of courts to make the most
effective use of trust funds in fulfilling the settlor's charitable purpose.
By his will, George W. Clayton had specifically provided for the estab-
ishment of Clayton College and had limited the eligible applicants to
"poor, white, male orphans between the ages of 6 and 10."1 9
The trust funds had increased substantially beyond that amount
required for the care, education and maintenance of the limited num-
ber of orphans admitted under strict interpretation of the will, so the
board of trustees petitioned the court for construction of the terms of
the trust and instructions.7 0  Although the applicability of cy pres was
not directly in issue, the court did briefly discuss the doctrine and in
dicated that it would not apply:
Regardless of the laudable desire of the board of trustees to ac-
commodate orphan boys generally, since there is a large increase
in the fund by which facilities could be provided and the benefi-
ciaries maintained and educated, the intent of the testator as ex-
pressed must control .7
1
Thirteen years later the same trust instrument was again before
the court.72  Despite the excellence of the institution's program, the
college had to advertise over the mass media for applicants meeting
the criteria of the trust. Even with this effort the college's facilities were
not being utilized to the fullest extent because of a lack of qualified stu-
dents. The trustees recognized that continued adherence to the trust
restrictions would eventually render the school obsolete, and they there-
fore petitioned the court to apply cy pres to the trust provisions so as to
eliminate the race and age restrictions to admission. The trial court
agreed with the trustees that continued operation of the school under
the restrictions was impracticable and ordered admission of orphans be.
tween the ages of 6 and 18 years regardless of color.
73
The decision of the trial court was affirmed en banc by the state
69. Dunbar v. Board of Trustees of George W. Clayton College, 170 Colo. 327,
328, 461 P.2d 28, 29 (1969).
70. Moore v. City and County of Denver, 133 Colo. 190, 192, 292 P.2d 986,
988 (1956).
71. Id. at 193, 292 P.2d at 988. In so holding, the court obviously gave a very
narrow construction of the "impracticability" criterion. The court explained its narrow
interpretation of "impracticability" in the following way: "In admitting that the cy
pres doctrine does not apply it is tantamount to saying that the terms of the will in-
volved are specific, understandable and can be carried into effect. That being true,
judicial construction must not be used in effect, to redraft the document. Petitioners
have not shown the impracticability of executing the express provisions of the trust."
Id.
72. Dunbar v. Board of Trustees of George W. Clayton College, 170 Colo. 327,
461 P.2d 28 (1969).
73. Id. at 328-29, 461 P.2d at 29.
February 19721 CY PRES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
supreme court which held that the will reflected the requisite broad,
general charitable intent necessary to sustain the application of the
court's cy pres power. The court cited the language of the testator to
show his charitable intent to create "a perpetual and growing institu-
tion bearing his name for the purpose of doing the greatest possible
good for the children of the State of Colorado who are without adequate
parental care. ' 74  The Colorado court then concluded that the applica-
tion of the cy pres power was warranted to carry out the intent of the
testator to establish an ever-growing college in order that " 'the greatest
possible good might be derived from his bequest.' ,71
A court may find that the restriction merely indicates a preference
of the settlor and may be deleted without affecting his general charitable
intent. In Wooten v. Fitz-Gerald,'7 6 a recent Texas appellate level case,
the testatrix had included the following provision in her holographic
will: "I give and bequeath my home and acreage. . . to be used for a
home for aged white men . . . . 77 Here as in Vanderhoofven (and
unlike Abney or Dunbar the improper racial restriction was stated briefly,
without elaboration within the document or by admission of extrinsic evi-
dence. The administrator of the testatrix's estate instituted an action
for construction and interpretation of the document, and asked the
court to declare a valid charitable trust and to define the scope and
limits of the beneficiary group. 78 The trial judge reviewed the lan-
guage of the will and held that a valid charitable trust existed.
On appeal, the heirs-at-law contended that if any trust was cre-
ated under the will it was a private rather than a public one and was
thus invalid as a charitable bequest. 79  In affirming the trial court's
74. Id. at 331, 461 P.2d at 30.
75. Id. Further evidence of charitable purpose in the instrument was the settlor's
request that others also contribute to this worthy cause. A further issue before the
Colorado Supreme Court was whether the facts supported the conclusion that it was
impracticable to continue administration of the trust under the conditions prescribed by
the settlor. Id. at 330, 461 P.2d at 30. Adhering to the view of the Second Re-
statement of Trusts and Professor Scott the court stated, "A purpose becomes imprac-
ticable when it appears that under the circumstances the application of the property to
that designated purpose would fail to accomplish the general charitable intention of
the testator." Id. at 330, 461 P.2d at 30. While recognizing "that many jurisdictions
still equate the word 'impracticable' with the word 'impossible' when dealing with the
cy pres doctrine," id. at 334, 461 P.2d at 32, the Colorado court was of the opinion
that that was an "unenlightened" view. Under the circumstances the court determined
that continued literal enforcement of the trust was impracticable. Id. The use of cy
pres in this decision indicates a liberalization in the court's attitude regarding the
exercise of this equitable power.
76. 440 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
77. Id. at 722.
78. Id. at 721.
79. Id. at 722. "The intended purpose must be such that the group benefited will
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holding that the trus was public and thus enforceable, the appellate
court reasoned that the validity of a charitable trust does not depend
on the inclusion of all the public as potential or contemplated benefi-
ciaries. Instead, the trust qualifies as a charitable bequest if the public
is relieved of some duty it would otherwise be compelled to bear."0
In confirming the existence of a general charitable intent, the appellate
court noted that "[tihe entire tenor and context of the trust"'81 evi-
denced the testatrix's broad charitable goals. The court also cited the
fact that the testatrix had provided for no gift over in the event the
trust failed, and that the terms of the trust did not expressly exclude
members of any race nor limit the benefits of the home solely to the
white race. -8 2  The court held that the testatrix's dominant purpose
was the establishment of a home for aged men and the inclusion of the
word "white" in the will indicated a mere preference of the testatrix
which could be deleted without defeating the intended charitable pur-
pose.83  Regarding the application of cy pres by the lower court the
Texas appellate court stated:
[W]e believe the court was within its equitable powers in delet-
ing the word "white" from the trust by applying the doctrine of ap-
proximation or cy pres. . . . We do not feel that this inclusion of
the word "white" defeats the purpose of the testatrix but, at most,
it is an unenforceable word and properly deleted by the lower
court.8 4
A change in external conditions may allow a court to strike the
restrictive provision, especially where the settlor has expressed a gen-
eral charitable intent and has failed to require that the restriction be
enforced literally. In Bank of Delaware v. Buckson,s5 a Delaware
Chancery Court decision of 1969, the settlor established a testamentary
trust to provide a scholarship fund for distribution to qualified "white
youths or young men."8" After administering the funds for thirty-
be sufficiently large to justify a finding of community interest in the enforcement of the
trust." 4A PowELL, supra note 3, 579, at 564.9. The testator's estate cannot
benefit from the favorable characteristics that attach to charitable bequests unless
implementation of the trust would relieve the public of a duty it would normally
bear.
80. Wooten v. Fitz-Gerald, 440 S.W.2d 719, 724 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
81. Id. at 726. In order to apply cy pres, courts frequently interpret the dis-
criminatory language that has rendered the trust illegal as "collateral" to the dominant
intent. Such objectionable wording is often disregarded by the court with the ex-
planation that such provisions expressed only secondary considerations or motivating
facts.
82. Id. at 726.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 725.
85. 255 A.2d 710 (Del. Ch. 1969).
86. Id. at 712.
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six years in compliance with "the mandate of the trust"-providing
scholarships only to white students-the trustees sought instructions
from the court as to the effect that had to be given to the racially re-
strictive language of the will. The trustees' action was prompted by
the fact that during the period of trust administration the percentage of
nonwhites in the student population had substantially increased.
8 7
The court initially observed that the testator had made only the
one reference to "white youths" in the detailed will-and in that in-
stance the phrase was used in the disjunctive form-" 'white youths' or
'young men'. '"8 The court concluded that the settlor had possessed a
general charitable purpose because his will contained only some small
individual bequests and the residue of the testator's property was left
in trust for a charitable, educational purpose.89 After thus having
found the settlor's dominant intent to be "the creation of scholarships
to benefit young men in the community,"90 the court applied cy pres
and ordered that the trust be administered without limitations as to
race because of the change in external conditions unforeseen by the
testator.
Literal compliance with the trust conditions may be found to de-
feat the testator's dominant charitable intent. For example, In re Es-
tate of Hawley,9 a 1961 Surrogate Court case in New York, involved a
testator who had left his residuary estate to the New York Protestant
Episcopal Public School, which operates Trinity School, to provide a
scholarship fund. In the terms of the will describing the award and
the procedure for selecting recipients, the testator had provided that a
potential beneficiary be a "communicant in good standing in the Pro-
testant Episcopal Church in the United States of America . . .the son
of native born American citizens. '9 2 The trustee of the fund made ap-
plication to the Surrogate's Court of New York County asking for a
construction of the testamentary provision and requesting the court to
amend the trust so as to remove the restrictions as to religion and na-
tional origin.
87. Id. at 714. In fact, if applicants were limited to whites, more than half of
the students would not be considered. Illustrative of the fact that there had been a
drastic change in the racial balance in the community is that one of the "scholarship
selection committeemen" [positions designated by the testator] was a black.
88. Id. at 713.
89. Id. The Buckson court also emphasized the size of the charitable bequest.
Compare id., with Estate of Vanderhoofven, 18 Cal. App. 3d 940, 946 n.1, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 260, 263-64 n.1 (1971).
90. 255 A.2d at 713. It must be remembered that in Vanderhoofven the court
was unsure as to testator's "dominant" motive and therefore remanded the case for
evidence. See notes 22-25 & accompanying text supra.
91. 32 Misc. 2d 624, 223 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sur. Ct. 1961).
92. Id. at 624, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
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The court held that the fact that the entire residuary estate was
devoted to the establishment of the scholarship fund was ample evi-
lence of a general intent to benefit the school, and not merely students
who met the religious and national origin specifications. The court also
observed that there had been a drastic reduction of students who qualified
under the restrictive provisions of the trust, and that unless the restrictions
were removed the trust fund would not be used to its full potential. The
court applied cy pres and deleted the objectionable limitations. The
court cited the language in another New York decision, In re Neher's
Will,93 as a justification for holding that "the restrictive condition was
[merely] 'grafted on' to the fundamental objective of the testamentary pro-
gram.
9 4
The discriminatory restrictions in the trust instrument may be mi-
nor factors which inhibit administering the trust in accordance with the
settlor's beneficial purpose. A case frequently cited for this proposi-
tion is Coffee v. William Marsh Rice University.9  Although Coffee
involved the "doctrine of deviation 9 6 rather than cy pres, the princi-
pies of the two theories are quite similar.97 In Coffee the donor had
made an inter vivos gift of a large sum of money for the establishment
of an endowment fund. In the terms of the trust, the donor directed
93. 279 N.Y. 370, 18 N.E.2d 625 (1939).
94. 32 Misc. 2d at 627, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 807. If the Hawley analysis were
applied in Vanderhoofven, it would seem to follow that the court could have logically
concluded that the religious and racial restrictions were "grafted on" to the broader
educational purpose manifested in the will. The court in Hawley faced a factual situa-
tion comparable to Vanderhoofven and utilized this "grafted on" analysis to uphold the
charitable trust.
95. 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
96. "Deviation" is employed where compliance with an administrative provision
of the trust is impossible, illegal or'in conflict with the purpose of the trust. Howard
Sav. Institution v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 502, 170 A.2d 39, 43 (1961). The Second
Restatement of Trusts defines the doctrine of deviation as follows: "The court will
direct or permit the trustee of a charitable trust to deviate from a term of the trust
if it appears to the court that compliance is impossible or illegal, or that owing to cir-
cumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him compliance would
defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust." RE-
STATEmENT (SEcoND) oF TRusTs § 381 (1959).
This equitable power is available to the courts without a finding of general
charitable intent. Fisch, Changing Concepts and Cy Pres, 44 CORNELL L. REv. 382,
389 (1959).
97. Deviation and cy pres are frequently confused, and often referred to in the
alternative, as if both terms describe the same judicial power. See, e.g., Smith v.
Moore, 343 F.2d 594, 601-02 (4th Cir. 1965). In fact Coffee has been cited as an
application of cy pres to remove a racial restriction. E.g., Bank of Delaware v. Buck-
son, 255 A.2d 710, 716 (Del. Ch. 1969). However, use of the doctrine of deviation
is properly confined to those situations where a minor term of the trust has become
impossible or illegal, causing difficulties in the administration of the trust. See note
96 supra.
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that the income from the fund was to be donated "to the instruction of
the white inhabitants of the City of Houston, and State of Texas."98
The donor also described an elaborate institute of higher education
which was to specialize in the instruction of technical sciences.
In construing the language of the trust instruments the appellate
court concluded that the primary purpose of the settlor was to establish
an educational institution.99 The court noted that a paragraph follow-
ing the racially restrictive terms in the trust instrument contained the
donor's directions that "the instruction, benefits and enjoyments to be
derived from the Institute [were] to be free and open to all; to be non-
sectarian and non-partisan . . . ."I" The court concluded that these
provisions in the trust instrument constituted the donor's predominant
intent, and that the race and tuition provisions were minor factors in-
hibiting the proper administration of the trust."' Thus, the appellate
court found the trial court's exercise of the equitable power of devia-
tion to vary from the exact terms of the trust to be fully justified. In
Coffee the court, utilizing the doctrine of deviation, authorized admis-
sion of all qualified students regardless of color, and permitted the
trustees to charge tuition if the student was in a position to pay for his
education.
To justify striking any discriminatory provisions from the trust in-
strument the court must find that the settlor had a dominant charitable
intent that should not be defeated by literally interpreting the restrictive
provisions. To ascertain this intent the court will carefully examine the
language of the settlor and the extrinsic evidence.' 2  For example, in
Howard Savings Institution v. Peep,"°3 a 1961 case decided by the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey, the settlor had bequeathed a large sum of
money in trust to Amherst College to be used as a scholarship fund for
"deserving American born, Protestant, Gentile boys of good moral re-
pute, not given to gambling, smoking, drinking or similar acts.' '10 4
The college, as named trustee, refused to accept the gift unless the
"Protestant-Gentile" limitation could be removed from the trust provi-
sions. The trial court applied cy pres and eliminated the restrictive
words in the trust.
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the will to
ascertain the existence or absence of a general charitable intent in its
98. Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966).
99. Id. at 282.
100. Id. at 272.
101. See id. at 285.
102. See notes 9-11 & accompanying text supra.
103. 34 N.J. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1961).
104. Id. at 497, 170 A.2d at 41.
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provisions and agreed with the trial judge that the settlor did possess a
broad charitable intent-to benefit his alma mater.10 5  Several factors
in the case were cited by the court in support of its holding that the
testator possessed the requisite charitable intent. First, the settlor had
previously made many sizeable inter vivos pledges to the school. Sec-
ondly, there had been no language in the bequest to Amherst to indi-
cate that the testator desired the trust should fail if the precise terms
could not be met. The testator had specifically provided such alterna-
tive disposition with respect to other gifts within the same instrument.
Thirdly, the testator had not named any family member in his will, ei-
ther as a residuary legatee or as recipient of the twenty specific bequests
in the will. In fact, in instructions to his scrivener, the donor had de-
nied the existence of any immediate family which would preclude an
intent to benefit such family members by invalidating the trust. And fi-
nally, the testator had included no provision for a reverter or gift over
of the scholarship funds in the event the trust should fail. This combi-
nation of factors led the appellate court to conclude that the settlor
would have preferred that the trust be administered in a modified
fashion rather than to allow the funds to be withdrawn from charitable
channels.' 0
As this brief survey of the more recent cases involving discrimina-
tory trusts indicates, courts willingly utilize cy pres to allow future ad-
ministration of the trust free of the discriminatory restrictions. Such
interpretation allows full utilization of the trust fund in accordance with
what is believed to be the settlor's general charitable intent.
Restrictive Application of Cy Pres
Not all courts, however, have been as receptive to the application
of cy pres to uphold charitable bequests. Two cases cited by Mr. Jus-
tice Black in Evans v. Abney'07 exemplify the restrictive application of
cy pres and will be briefly considered below.
In LaFond v. City of Detroit'0 8 the testatrix's will contained the
following residuary clause:
105. Id. at 505-06, 170 A.2d at 45.
106. Id. at 504-06, 170 A.2d at 44-46. Another indication that the settlor de-
sired to benefit the school and not merely those students meeting his rigid criteria
was the fact that Amherst College was named as residuary legatee. Id. at 505,
170 A.2d at 45.
Compare Vanderhoofven, where the testator left the bulk of his estate to charity,
made no provision for a gift over or reversion in case the charity failed, included no
residuary clause, and impliedly disinherited his family by giving them the token
amount of one dollar each. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 943, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
107. 396 U.S. 435, 441 n.1 (1970).
108. 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d 530 (1959).
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The balance of my estate after deducting [certain specific] be-
quests is to be given to the city of Detroit, Wayne county [sic],
Michigan for a playfield for white children, and known as the
"Sagendorph Field."'109
The testatrix also stated in her will that she wanted its terms "carried
out to the letter." 110  Since the discriminatory provision-for white
children-could not be given effect, the trial court concluded that the
testatrix would have preferred intestacy to any other construction of
the will. The court specifically rejected application of cy pres on the
basis that the will provisions were not so indefinite as to be capable of
some other construction.
On appeal of the case to the Michigan Supreme Court, the justices
were evenly divided as to whether the trial court should have applied
cy pres, and this split meant affirmance of the trial court's decision.
The justices who voted to affirm the trial court viewed the words "for
white children" as words of command which precluded application of
the bequest to any other purpose than the one designated. The absence
of any ambiguity in the terms of the will was held by the justices to pro-
hibit the application of cy pres."'
The justices who favored reversal of the trial court, on the other
hand, stressed the following broad language of a Michigan statute which
was interpreted by the justices to require the application of cy pres by
the trial judge:
Every [charitable] trust shall be liberally construed by such court
so that the intentions of the creator thereof shall be carried out
whenever possible.
1 2
These justices cited approvingly the position of the Restatement of
Trusts that cy pres should be utilized to uphold a trust containing some
illegal provision:
A disposition for charitable purposes may fail, in whole or in part,
either at the outset or subsequently, because the purposes or some
of them are or become illegal. In such a case the doctrine of cy
pres is applicable unless the settlor manifested an intention that
the property should be applied solely to the purpose which is or has
become illegal."1
3
109. Id. at 363, 98 N.W.2d at 530.
110. Id. at 365, 98 N.W.2d at 531. The testatrix's will provisions were contrary
to the laws of the State of Michigan and the United States, so the bequest could not
be effectuated as written.
111. "The will does not indicate a general intention to provide for a general
charitable purpose rather than for a particular designated object. The cy pres
doctrine is used to aid the court in carrying out the true intention of the donor and
cannot be used for the purpose of eliminating the unambiguous words found in de-
ceased's will." Id. at 368, 98 N.W.2d at 533.
112. Id. at 371, 98 N.W.2d at 534-35.
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399, comment n (1959).
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The justices favoring reversal did not view the provisions of the will
as expressing an exclusionary purpose114 and, instead, interpreted the
will as an attempt by the testatrix to donate the bulk of her estate to the
city for a charitable purpose-construction of a playground for the chil-
dren of Detroit.
Justice Black in Evans also referred to First Universalist Society v.
Sweet,"r5 a 1952 Maine case in which the testator had bequeathed
$5000 to the Universalist Church located in Bath, Maine. The testa-
tor directed that the principle be held intact and that the income be
used for the support of the church.11 Several years after the death of
the testator, the church in Bath and all of the church property, except
the fund in question, was conveyed to the parent state organization.
The society asked the court to construe the will and to direct that the
trust fund, and any accrued income, be turned over to the society's
state organization.
The lower court upheld the trust on the basis that the testator had
evidenced a general charitable intent and held that the bequest had
not been strictly limited in scope-restricted to the benefit of only the
local church. The Supreme Court of Maine reversed this interpreta-
tion of the will by the trial court" 7 by reference to the following find-
ings of fact: (1) the testator was not a parishioner of the church, (2)
he knew nothing of its connection to the parent state body, and (3) his
only apparent desire was to see the local church continue to function.'
18
114. "It would take clearer and more dramatic language than we find in this
will for us to hold that testatrix' real intention was one of revenge rather than
one of charity. Even if the word 'white' contained in her bequest be thought of as a
word of exclusion (and the testatrix did not so recuire), we believe the basic purpose
of the bequest is patently that of a memorial to her husband and herself to perpetuate
their memory in a playground for children in the city of Detroit." 357 Mich. at
372-73, 98 N.W.2d at 535.
115. 148 Me. 142, 90 A2d 812 (1952).
116. Id. at 90 A.2d at 813.
117. Id. at 90 A.2d at 816.
118. Id. It should be observed that, prior to consideration of this case, the
Maine courts had considered application of cy pres on at least eight occasions. Stevens
v. Smith, 134 Me. 175, 183 A. 344 (1936); Snow v. Bowdoin College, 133 Me. 195,
175 A. 268 (1934); Bancroft v. Maine State Sanatorium Ass'n, 119 Me. 56, 109 A.
585 (1920); Gilman v. Burnett, 116 Me. 382, 102 A. 108 (1917); Lynch v. South
Congregational Parish, 109 Me. 32, 82 A. 432 (1912); Allen v. Nasson Institute,
107 Me. 120, 77 A. 638 (1910); Brooks v. City of Belfast, 90 Me. 318, 38 A. 222
(1897); Doyle v. Whalen, 87 Me. 414, 32 A. 1022 (1895). In only three of those
cases did the court find a sufficient expression of general charitable intent to enable it
to apply the doctrine. Stevens v. Smith, 134 Me. 175, 183 A. 344 (1936); Snow v.
Bowdoin College, 133 Me. 195, 175 A. 268 (1934); and Lynch v. South Congrega-
tional Parish, 109 Me. 32, 82 A. 432 (1912). Numbers alone would indicate that
the Maine courts are reluctant to apply cy pres and construe trust instruments narrowly
in their search for an expression of general charitable intent.
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Considering the time frame of the two previous cases, their effect
on the development of cy pres is minimized. The more recent cases re-
viewed in this note regarding the appropriateness of cy pres in a dis-
criminatory trust situation indicate that the courts favor use of the doc-
trine to give continued effect to charitable bequests.
California's Liberal View of Cy Pres
A review of recent cases involving charitable trusts brought be-
fore the California courts suggests that the courts have made liberal use
of the cy pres power. California thus follows the modem trend rather
than the restrictive approach.
Indefiniteness of Beneficiary
The new liberal trend in the application of cy pres by the Cali-
fornia courts is most noticeable in a series of cases involving "indefinite-
ness of beneficiary.-"1 19
A comparison of a recent appellate decision, Estate of Cafferty,'12
with one of the earlier state cases in this area, Estate of Zilke,121 perhaps
best reveals the change that has taken place in California regarding cy
pres. In Zilke, a 1931 decision, the testator, by holographic will, de-
vised his entire estate as follows: "When I am dead I wont [sic] every-
ting [sic] to go to Offens [sic] home of San Francisco."'2 2 Seven
San Francisco orphanages claimed rights tinder the will but agreed to
divide the proceeds equally if the court interpreted the will as an at-
tempt to make a charitable bequest. The superior court, without the
119. One of the fundamental characteristics of a charitable trust is indefiniteness
of the beneficiary. Unlike a private trust, a charitable trust has no individually iden-
tified beneficiaries, but rather a designated charitable purpose. 4A POWELL, supra
note 3, 579, at 564.9. At present, the courts recognize six purposes as sufficient to
warrant the finding of a charitable trust: "(a) the relief of poverty; (b) the advance-
ment of education; (c) the advancement of religion; (d) the promotion of health; (e)
governmental or municipal purposes; [and] (f) other purposes the accomplishment of
which is beneficial to the community." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368
(1959).
The beneficiary is usually comprised of a large group of indefinite number.
The smaller the number in the beneficiary group the greater the likelihood that the be-
quest will be challenged as establishing a private and not a public (charitable) trust.
In other words, beneficiaries must be sufficiently numerous so that trust implementation
will relieve the community of some obligation it would normally bear, making enforce-
ment of the trust a community interest. 4A POWELL, supra note 3, 579, at 564.9.
It is only necessary that the object of the bequest be identified with sufficient
certainty so that the trustee will know to whom the funds should be distributed.
120. 246 Cal. App. 2d 711, 55 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1966).
121. 115 Cal. App. 63, 1 P.2d 475 (1931).
122. Id. at 64, 1 P.2d at 476.
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benefit of any extrinsic evidence, held that the seven orphanages should
share the bequest. On appeal, however, the appellate court reasoned
that because the testator used the singular (home) and not the plural
(homes), the language in the will was ambiguous and was thus insuf-
ficient to support a bequest to any of the claimant orphanages. 12 8 The
appellate court reversed the trial court's decree, refused to apply cy
pres, and based its holding on the testator's lack of clarity in making his
purported bequest:
Whatever [testator's] actual intention may have been, he failed
to express it with reasonable certainty, and it is impossible to ascer-
tain it from the will itself. Upon the record before us, the decree
is based upon speculation and conjecture as to what his intention
was. . . . "Courts are not permitted, in order to avoid a conclu-
sion of intestacy, to adopt a construction based on conjecture as to
what the testator may have intended, although not expressed."'12 4
In Cafferty, a 1966 California case, the testatrix, after numerous
specific bequests, had left the "[b]alance of [her] estate to be divided
between help for the blind the Lepor [sic] Colony & Brightside orfon-
age [sic] Holyoke Mass."' 25  The superior court found the words "help
for the blind" to be too vague to constitute a charitable bequest 26 and
decreed that the purported bequest be distributed to the testatrix's fam-
ily in accordance with the laws of intestate succession. On appeal by
the California Attorney General, however, the appellate court reversed
the lower court and held that the testatrix's intent to create a trust to
provide "help for the blind" was clear and that the lower court should
have applied cy pres to uphold the charitable bequest.'
27
The holding of the Callerty court is pertinent to the discussion of
Vanderhoofven for two reasons: (1) the court found cy pres applicable
despite the indefiniteness of testatrix's charitable object and (2) the
court felt that absence of extrinsic evidence was no barrier to interpret-
ing the necessary wording nor to the use of cy pres to uphold the chari-
table bequest. 28 As in Vanderhoofven the settlor in Cafferty also had
failed to designate a trustee or to use specific language that indicated a
desire to establish a trust; however, this omission was deemed unim-
portant to the validity of the charitable bequest. When the language in
the will establishes the requisite intent for a charitable bequest, the
California courts impress the property with a trust and appoint a suitable
trustee.
29
123. Id. at 65, 1 P.2d at 477.
124. Id. at 66, 1 P.2d at 477.
125. 246 Cal. App. 2d at 711, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
126. Id. at 712, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
127. Id. at 714, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
128. Id. at 713, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
129. See, e.g., Estate of Faulkner, 128 Cal. App. 2d 575, 275 P.2d 818 (1954);
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Unforeseen Change in Conditions
Another line of cases in which cy pres has been exercised by the
California courts are cases in which literal compliance with the testa-
tor's expressed charitable intent would be impracticable because of
an unforeseen change in conditions.13 In one such case, Mosk v.
Summerland Spiritualist Association". decided by a state appellate
court in 1964, the settlor had created a trust to provide a temple site
and to otherwise benefit spiritualists in Summerland, California. The
spiritualist association moved from Summerland but remained active in
another California community. Upon application by the spiritualists to
continue the trust, the court found that the settlor had possessed a
general charitable intent-promotion of spiritualism132-and awarded
the trust res to the spiritualists in the other community.
In an analogous case, Society of California Pioneers v. McElroy, "
the settlor had bequeathed funds for the construction of a monument
atop Telegraph Hill in San Francisco as a memorial to California's pio-
neers. Subsequent to the settlor's death, but prior to probate of his
will, Coit Memorial Tower was erected at the location specified for the
memorial, thus rendering the bequest impracticable. The court re-
viewed the testator's will and found a general charitable intent suffi-
cient to maintain the trust even in such changed circumstances. The
court applied its cy pres power and directed that the bequest be used for
acquisition of historical documents and installation of markers com-
memorating important events of the pioneer period. As the basis for its
decision, the court noted the testator's many bequests for charitable pur-
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 397, comment f (1959); 4 A. SCOTT, supra
note 4, § 397. The will in Vanderhoofven also lacked specificity as to the particular
engineering institution to be benefited. However, the settlor's expression "I care not
which" would indicate that this omission was to be filled at the discretion of the ad-
ministrator. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 942-43, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
130. Since charitable trusts are not subject to the rule against perpetuities, their
duration is potentially indefinite. See 4A POWELL, supra note 3, 584. On occasion
intervening circumstances will make literal compliance impossible, impracticable or ille-
gal. Seldom does the settlor make a provision for such a contingency; so the court
must make an "educated guess" as to what the settlor would have wanted had he
envisioned failure of the expressed intent. See, e.g., Howard Say. Inst'n v. Peep,
34 N.J. 494, 501, 170 A.2d 39, 43 (1961); G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 436, at 423-24 (2d ed. 1964).
In Vanderhoofven effectuation of the settlor's intent was illegal-contrary to both
public policy and the constitutional provision requiring equal protection of the laws.
Hence, the court had to decide what the settlor would have wanted had he thought
about a possible failure before it can determine what action to take in order to
approximate his intentions.
131. 225 Cal. App. 2d 376, 37 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1964).
132. Id. at 381, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
133. 63 Cal. App. 2d 332, 146 P.2d 962 (1944).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23
February 1972C
poses of a historical nature and held that the testator's primary purpose
for the bequest was to establish a memorial to the California pioneers,
and that the instructions to construct a monument on top of Telegraph
Hill was merely a secondary preference."'
In an unusual California case,135 decided by a federal district
court in 1944, the court applied California law and found a general
charitable intent even though the language used by the testator was
quite specific. The testator had devised his ranch to Mari County
and directed that the ranch income be used to provide aid to crippled
and blind residents of the county. The will provisions expressly pro-
hibited the sale of the land and provided for a reversion in the event
any sale was attempted.13 6 The United States Government subse-
quently expanded a nearby air base and took the ranch under con-
demnation proceedings. In the ensuing litigation to determine who
should receive the condemnation proceeds, the court held that the gov-
ernment's condemnation proceedings did not destroy the trust, and the
funds should continue to be applied under cy pres for the aid of the
county's needy crippled and blind. Implicit in the court's holding was
the determination that condemnation proceedings by the government
do not constitute a sale; therefore, the fact that the will expressly pro-
vided that the county should forfeit all rights if the property was sold
was disregarded.
13 7
Insufficient Funds to Fulfill Purpose
In occasional cases, the distributable estate is substantially less
than was anticipated by the testator when he prepared his will. The
question facing the court in such a situation is whether the testator
would have desired that the funds, though insufficient to fully accom-
134. Id. at 336, 146 P.2d at 964. Where effectuation of a charitable bequest is
impracticable because real property devised for a certain purpose has become unsuit-
able for the intended use, courts will apply cy pres if they conclude that the objects
of the trust will thereby be more effectively carried out. This was the situation in a
California case where property was devised for the erection of a church. With the
passage of time the property had become too valuable and unsuitable for a church site.
However, the court held that, in the exercise of its equitable cy pres power, it could
authorize the sale of trust property to more nearly comply with the settlor's intent.
Alemany v. Wensinger, 40 Cal. 288 (1870).
135. United States v. 263.5 Acres of Land, 54 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Cal. 1944).
136. Id. at 693.
137. The provision of the will specified that the County of Matin should at no
time sell or mortgage or attempt to sell or mortgage the land. The heirs-at-law con-
tended that the government's taking by condemnation amounted to a "sale"; however,
the court held that "such an involuntary parting with the property" would not constitute
a sale. The testator had not defined the term in his will, and therefore, the court
applied the usual and customary meaning of the word. See id. at 693.
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plish the expressed charitable purpose, be kept in trust nevertheless and
applied in a manner most closely approximating that purpose. The
California courts have consistently upheld the charitable purpose rather
than permit its abandonment merely because less funds are available
than the settlor originally anticipated.13
For example, in an 1899 decision by the California Supreme Court,
Estate of Royer,139 the settlor had left the residue of his estate as
follows:
[U]nto the University of the State of California, for the sole pur-
pose of founding a professorship of "Political Economy," and for
no other purpose whatever. If the said gift and devise shall for
any reason fail, the same shall revert to my next of kin. 140
At the testator's death, the residue of his estate was found insufficient
to establish a professorship at the University of California, and the lower
court held that the gift therefore had failed. The California Supreme
Court, however, held that a resolution by the university regents as to
the sufficiency of the bequest for the stated purpose was not determina-
tive, and the court directed application of the funds to the university
under the cy pres power. Thus, despite the provisions in the will that
the bequest was to be used for the "sole purpose of founding a pro-
fessorship . . . and for no other purpose whatever, ' 141 cy pres was
held by the court to be appropriate to give effect to the charitable be-
quest.1
4 2
The following California Supreme Court decision, which also in-
volved the insufficiency of the bequest for the stated purpose, was even
more liberal in the application of the cy pres power, in that the court
expressed a "duty" to apply the doctrine once it found a broad chari-
table intent. In O'Hara v. Grand Lodge'43 the testator's will had pur-
ported to establish a trust to maintain an orphans' home. Literal com-
pliance with the terms of the trust became impossible because: the
designated buildings were in such a poor state of repair; the income set
aside to operate the facility was insufficient; also, the number of or-
phans using the home was so small as to make it of little value. For
these reasons, the court authorized the sale of the trust property on the
138. E.g., Estate of Loring, 29 Cal. 2d 423, 175 P.2d 524 (1946).
139. 123 Cal. 614, 56 P. 461 (1899).
140. Id. at 615, 56 P. at 461 (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. If the settlor does not specify the dimensions of his charitable object
and the court determines that a project of less magnitude than possibly envisioned
could be provided with the limited funds, cy pres will be applied to carry out the
intent as nearly as possible. E.g., In re Estate of Peabody, 154 Cal. 173, 97 P. 184
(1908).
143. 213 Cal. 131, 2 P.2d 21 (1931).
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basis that this would best carry out the general purpose of the trust.,,4
The court found that equity compelled it to apply the trust fund to carry
out any expression of a general charitable intent, "even though so to do
requires a change in the method or means specified in the trust instru-
ment."'14 5 In determining whether a general charitable intent existed
in the trust instrument, the court used some extremely revealing lan-
guage. The court stated that "the trust instrument is always construed
most strongly against the trustor, for the reason that the courts favor
charities,"' 6 and also remarked that, once a general charitable pur-
pose is ascertained, a presumption is created that "the creator of
the trust did not desire the trust to fail."' 47
Refusal of Trustee to Cooperate
The California courts have also applied cy pres in cases where the
trustee refuses to cooperate or is remiss in fulfilling his duties. For
example, certain institutions or organizations, which would normally be
considered suitable objects of a charitable bequest, may refuse to ac-
cept the tendered gift because of internal organizational policies.
Exemplifying the courts' tendency to find a broad charitable in-
tent even in these cases is the 1954 decision in Estate of Faulkner.148
In Faulkner the testatrix named as residuary legatees of her will some
nine charities, one of which was the organization Alcoholics Anony-
mous. Because of an internally established policy of accepting gifts
only from members, Alcoholics Anonymous refused the legacy. Be-
cause of this refusal, the lower court ruled that the gift would pass to
the heirs of the testatrix.
The court of appeal, however, reasoned that a finding that a gift
is charitable imposes a duty on the tribunal to apply cy pres if at all
possible.' 0  In the Faulkner situation the court held that the chari-
table purposes could be accomplished by distribution of the funds to an-
other organization whose object was to aid alcoholics. As in Vander-
hooften, the testatrix's will in Faulknr lacked a statement of definite
trust. The will contained no instructions or duties; however, the court
found the purpose of the bequest to be "obvious"-the rehabilitation
of alcoholics, and stated that the trustee's duties would be specified by
144. Id. at 141, 2 P.2d at 25.
145. Id. "Mhe plaintiff corporation held the property as trustee 'for the sole
purpose of locating and establishing an Orphans' Home thereon' and 'to forever main-
tain an Orphans' Home. .. ."' Id. at 137, 2 P.2d at 23.
146. Id. at 141, 2 P.2d at 25.
147. Id.
148. 128 Cal. App. 2d 575, 275 P.2d 818 (1954).
149. Id. at 579, 275 P.2d at 821.
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the court.150
Discriminatory Trusts
Not only have California courts willingly applied cy pres in the
situations above, but there is some California precedent for a liberal
application of cy pres in the case of a discriminatory trust. In Estate
of Walker,"' a 1965 superior court decision, the will directed that the
bulk of the testatrix's estate was to go to the Stanford University's medi-
cal school to establish a fellowship fund. To qualify for the fellowships,
the recipients had to be "of the white race, protestant religion, and citi-
zens of the United States, Canada, England, Scotland, Ireland, or
Wales. 152 The university rejected the gift pending a change in the terms
to state a mere preference for white recipients and the complete deletion
of any religious requirement. The California attorney general went even
further and requested complete deletions of all racial and religious re-
quirements. Because the testatrix's bequest to the university comprised
the bulk of her estate, the court found the charitable intent to pervade the
will. The court applied cy pres to carry out what was deemed to be
the testatrix's predominant intent-to benefit education-and struck
out the discriminatory provisions on the basis that they merely reflected
a secondary intent in the will.
Conclusion
This case-by-case development of the law relating to cy pres indi-
cates that the courts are gradually becoming less hesitant to utilize this
equitable power to give continued effect to a charitable trust. No
longer are the courts adhering so rigidly to the "traditional prerequi-
sites" recognized for application of the doctrine.1 -
Gifts given in outright terms to a charitable donee have been
150. Id. at 580, 275 P.2d at 822. In the event the trustee is not peforming his
duties in conformity with his obligation (his normal fiduciary duty as a trustee or
any special duties set out in the trust agreement), the court will appoint a successor
trustee rather than allow the trust to fail. E.g. Hart v. County of Los Angeles, 260 Cal.
App. 2d 512, 67 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1968). This position lends further support to the
policy that courts will not allow a charitable trust to fail if maintenance is at all
possible.
151. No. 70195, Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Barbara County, Apr. 23, 1965.
152. See Nelkin, Cy Pres and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Discriminating
Look at Very Private Schools and Not So Charitable Trusts, 56 GEo. L.J. 272, 297
(1967).
153. See DiClerico, Cy Pres. A Proposal for Change, 47 B.U.L. REv. 153
(1967); Fisch, Changing Concepts and Cy Pres, 44 CORNELL L. REv. 382 (1959).
The traditional prerequisites are enumerated as follows: (1) a valid charitable trust;
(2) an impossibility, impracticability, or illegality in administering the trust; and (3) an
expression of general charitable intent. 4A POWELL, supra note 3, 587, at 564.63.
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held 'subject to a trust' or a trust has been implied, a general chari-
table intent almost invariably uncovered, and impossibility or im-
practicality found with increasing ease.154
Statutory embodiments of cy pres have, in some states, dispensed with
one or more of the prerequisites;155 and the courts in at least one state
have refused to find such requirements prerequisites to the exercise of cy
pres unless the statutes expressly include them. 56 The courts have
held that in a will purporting to manifest the settlor's "sole" desire
and even directions to apply the funds "for no other purpose" does not
preclude the use of cy pres. 57 Nor is the fact that the terms of the
trust or will provide for (1) a gift over,15 8 or (2) a reversionary provi-
sion 59 to take effect in the event the charitable purpose failed consid-
ered as controlling the court's application of cy pres.
Once the court has acknowledged the existence of a charitable in-
tent broad enough to supplant dispositions which are found to be im-
possible, impracticable, or illegal, the resort to cy pres has been a
natural step. In determining the existence or absence of a general
charitable intent, the court exercises great discretionary power in the fi-
nal disposition of the case. If the court holds that the language in the
trust or will is general, the charitable bequest can be upheld. On the
other hand, if the court construes the language in the will or trust lit-
erally or strictly, the charitable bequest will often fail. The initial de-
termination by the court as to which of the two approaches to follow-
liberal or strict interpretation-preordains the settlor's intent. How-
ever, since public policy is said to be in favor of charitable trusts, the
courts have been increasingly liberal in finding the requisite general
charitable intent.160
Courts have also become more mindful of the community's need,
and the liberal application of cy pres has mirrored that increase in so-
154. Fisch, Changing Concepts and Cy Pres, 44 CORNELL L. REV. 382, 383
(1959).
155. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.10 (1950), making cy pres applicable whether
the intention of the settlor be "general" or "specific"; N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 12-a
(1962) and N.Y. EsT. PowERs & TRUSTS LAw § 8-1.4 (1967), eliminating the trust
requirement from its cy pres statute.
156. See McDonough County Orphanage v. Bumhart, 5 Ill. 2d 230, 125 N.E.2d
625 (1955).
157. In re Estate of Royer, 123 Cal. 614, 56 P. 461 (1899); see La Fond v. City
of Detroit, 357 Mich. 362, 369, 98 N.W.2d 530, 533 (1959) (dissenting opinion);
REsrATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRusTs § 399, comment c (1959). Contra, La Fond v.
City of Detroit, 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d 530 (1959).
158. Society of California Pioneers v. McElroy, 63 Cal. App. 2d 332, 146 P.2d
962 (1944).
159. In re Estate of Royer, 123 Cal. 614, 56 P. 461 (1899).
160. 4A POWELL, supra note 3, f 587, at 564.68. But see 4 A. Scowr, supra note
4, § 399.4.
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cial consciousness. In light of this fact alone, application of the cy
pres doctrine in Estate of Vanderhoofven would have been a logical
step for the California appellate court. Even though the court of ap-
peal has now ordered the case remanded in order to entertain extrinsic
evidence of the testator's intention, there appears to be ample authority
supporting an immediate application of cy pres by the lower court to
uphold the charitable bequest.
A case construing a testamentary trust that includes discrimina-
tory language has yet to be heard by the Supreme Court of California.
There is, however, ample authority from other jurisdictions which have
considered this specific issue to warrant application of cy pres by the
California courts to eliminate the objectionable provisions and to give
continued life to charitable bequests.
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